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On October 2, 1990, the political leaderships of both Slovenia and Croatia officially 
proposed a new confederal agreement to the four other republics of the Yugoslav fed-
eration. If it had been accepted, the proposed Yugoslav confederation (or the Union 
of Yugoslav States that the proposal suggested as an alternative), would have turned 
Yugoslavia into a loose association of independent states, each of which would be 
recognized as a sovereign state—both by other members of the confederation and 
in the sense of international law.
Croatian scholar of international law Vladimir Djuro Degan was the main author 
of the draft of both the document titled Model of Yugoslav Confederation and the actual 
Confederal Treaty that accompanied it.1 He has noted that the documents were based 
upon the assumption of contractual mutual recognition of full state sovereignty and 
international subjectivity of all post-Yugoslav states. The confederation plan called 
for a “union of states,” not a “state union.” In a structural sense the proposed con-
federation was to be modelled almost as a copy of the European Community, only 
marginally adapted to specific post-Yugoslav circumstances. Although the proposal 
and the contract offered many alternative solutions for practical issues—such as, for 
example, three options regarding the monetary issues, two on the issue of transport, 
three on the structure of defence forces, three on coordination of foreign policy, and 
many more on the structure (and existence) of the institutions of confederation— 
it offered no alternative to the proposal for statehood. According to the draft 
 confederal agreement, all Yugoslav republics would recognize each other’s right to 
unrestricted self-determination at any time. Some functions could still be delegated 
to joint institutions. However, each member-state would have the inalienable right 
to revoke any authority delegated to the confederation.
The Yugoslav confederation would, therefore, have discontinued the existence 
of Yugoslavia as sovereign state. A commonwealth of six internationally recognized 
sovereign states willing to cooperate with each other would have been established in 
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its place. At least from the Slovenian perspective, the proposed confederation was 
to be a la carte, one that would allow its member-states to chose freely which (if 
any) elements of their sovereignty they wished to delegate to confederative bodies 
and which they wished to keep exclusively for themselves. The Croatian political 
elite viewed the confederation in somewhat more formal and more legally binding 
terms—with more precise rules and obligations—as long as full sovereignty of all 
the new states was recognized, including the unlimited right to withdrawal.2 In their 
initial proposal, Slovenia and Croatia suggested that the confederal treaty should be 
time-limited to either five or ten years, with the possibility remaining open for any 
republic to leave at any time, even within this limited period.
Two weeks following the formal joint proposal, the Yugoslav state presidency 
rejected the plan. The representatives of the other four republics, as well as both 
autonomous provinces of Serbia, were also against. This left Slovenia and Croatia 
with no official support from any of the federal units.3 While Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Macedonia later accepted some elements of this proposal (but not before May 
1991), Serbia (and to some degree Montenegro) remained hostile to the very end. 
At the same time the international community and its main representatives were 
 opposed to the initial proposal because they still favored the formula of a “democratic 
and united” Yugoslavia and supported the federal government of Ante Marković. It 
was only later, not before September 1991, that they, too, agreed that the confederal 
agreement might perhaps be the last chance to save some form of institutionalized 
cooperation between the Yugoslav republics and (more importantly) to prevent an 
all-out war between them. However, by then it seemed it was already too late for a 
compromise. A confederation is, after all, an association of friendly states who are 
willing to cooperate, not a union of hostile and highly nationalistic states, most of 
which did not hesitate to use violence to achieve their strategic objectives.
With hindsight, one could indeed conclude that the confederation proposal 
was a missed opportunity for compromise between two bitterly divided sides: those 
who insisted on as much sovereignty as possible for all Yugoslav republics and those 
who preferred a recentralized Yugoslav state. An attempt to create a similar union of 
independent states on the constitutional ruins of the USSR did, indeed, offer some 
breathing space to the countries of the former Soviet Union, although it did not 
survive much beyond the immediate crises. Furthermore, it is one of the paradoxes 
of the Yugoslav tragedy that certain elements of a confederalist structure appeared 
in the postwar arrangements in many parts of former Yugoslavia. For example, the 
Washington agreement concluded in 1994 between Croatia and the government of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was based on a promise of a postwar confederation between 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The structure of post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina 
is also rather loose. There, the institutional and constitutional relationship between 
Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina effectively resembles 
some of the original Slovenian-Croatian confederal proposal. The relationship between 
Serbia and Montenegro, the two units of the Serbia-Montenegro state union (as 
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defined by the Belgrade agreement of 2003) was equally loose. There were two cur-
rencies, few joint institutions and clear recognition of the sovereignty (i.e., the right 
of secession) of both republics. Unfortunately these arrangements were put in place 
only in the aftermath of several bloody conflicts that the initial confederal proposal 
had aimed at avoiding.
So, why did the Slovenian and Croatian confederal proposal of October 1990 
fail? Was it a viable option at the time, or just a tactical move, an attempt to buy 
time and to prepare for the war that followed? What were the intentions of the 
 political leaders of the two republics who proposed the confederation? Did they see 
it as a permanent solution, the one that could prevent violent disintegration—or as 
a temporary (and basically tactical) arrangement that would help them to achieve 
full independence for their two countries?
In this chapter I argue that the confederalist proposal was a genuine attempt 
to achieve first a de facto and then a de jure independence without violence. The 
ultimate objective was not a confederation but the international recognition of sov-
ereignty and thus, ultimately, the full state independence of Slovenia and Croatia. 
The confederation was seen as a vehicle for this objective and as a good initial com-
promise that might prevent the violence that would inevitably characterize any open 
conflict with Serbia and/or the Yugoslav federal institutions (primarily, the Yugoslav 
People’s Army, JNA).
This argument is based not only on analysis of political statements and deci-
sions made at the time when the events were unfolding (i.e., during 1990), but also 
on analysis of recently published memoirs by the main participants in Croatian and 
Slovenian politics of the 1990s. With no exception, both Croatian and Slovenian 
politicians involved in decision-making processes in 1990 today admit that these two 
republics were only half-heartedly promoting their own project. The most explicit is 
perhaps Mario Nobilo, who in the early 1990s was the chief foreign policy advisor 
to Croatian President Tudjman. In his political memoirs published in 2000, Nobilo 
concludes that the “Croatian-Slovenian confederation project was little more than 
an attempt to buy time until our government was consolidated, until the issue of 
state-making was internationalized, thus ultimately—[it was] only an intermediate 
phase toward the full independence.”4 According to Nobilo, the main strategy of the 
Croatian and Slovenian leaderships in the final months of Yugoslavia was “to paralyse 
federal institutions as much as we could, so that their reaction to the ever widening 
independence of certain parts of Yugoslavia was weaker and more confused.”5 In 
 addition, the confederation proposal was an attempt to convince international fac-
tors, that is, other states and international institutions involved in the Yugoslav crisis, 
that Croatia and Slovenia wanted a peaceful solution and a compromise. It served 
as an alibi to Slovenian and Croatian elites, who needed to demonstrate clearly that 
it was Serbia, not they, who destroyed Yugoslavia beyond possible repair. As France 
Bučar, the chairman of the Slovenian parliament said while the confederal proposal 
was still being drafted (September 1, 1990), “In no case we should take upon ourselves 
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a burden of accusation that we [the Slovenes] undermined Yugoslavia from within. 
Let those who have indeed undermined it take full responsibility.”6 Sources presented 
in this chapter—including statements and articles published by leading Slovenian 
and Croatian politicians during the events of fall 1990—are largely consistent with 
Nobilo’s later interpretation.
However, one could also conclude that although Slovenia and Croatia did not 
whole-heartedly believe that the confederal arrangement had a realistic chance of suc-
ceeding, they did genuinely hope that it could prevent a war by facilitating a peaceful 
route to the disintegration of Yugoslavia.7 As Nobilo points out, the confederal model 
offered by Slovenia and Croatia was not intended as a blueprint for an ideal (or even 
desirable) institutional and political framework for post-Yugoslav space. Nevertheless, 
it did indeed represent “an attempt on the part of the weaker [republics] to avoid 
conflict, the aggression of the Yugoslav Army, and Serbian domination.”8 The driving 
forces behind the Slovenian and Croatian independence movements would not have 
sacrificed their ultimate objective—full independence—for peace. However, they did 
initially endeavour to achieve independence peacefully. It was only as a result of the 
failure of this attempt that they resorted to violence, which was in their view a form 
of self-defence and, therefore, a legitimate means of achieving independence.
The failure of the confederal proposal, however, cannot be fully attributed to its 
tactical character, that is, to the fact that neither the Slovenes nor the Croats seemed 
to be fully committed to their own concept. There were at least four other equally 
important factors at work.
Firstly, no other republic in Yugoslavia supported the confederal proposal at the 
time it was presented. In fact, they became supportive of it only once it was too late, 
namely after the first serious military conflict had come to a close (the one in Slovenia, 
June 26–July 7, 1991), and when Croatia faced an all-out attack by the joint forces 
of Krajina Serbs, the Serbian “volunteers,” and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in 
Summer 1991. Back in October 1990, when discussed by the Yugoslav state presi-
dency, the confederalist proposal was rejected by a majority of 6 votes to 2.9
Secondly, although Slovenia and Croatia appeared to be united behind their 
joint confederalist proposal, there were still significant (and often visible) differences 
between them, both in terms of tactics (such as the dynamics of political change) 
and to some extent in terms of the desirable outcome, too. By the time of the first 
democratic elections in the two republics (in April and May 1990), Slovenia was 
already much more advanced on its road to full independence. While it cooperated 
with Croatia in their joint attempt to prevent the recentralisation of Yugoslavia, it 
also viewed Croatia as an anchor that was slowing down its own progress toward 
full independence. This was especially the case after August 17, 1990, when Croatia 
faced a rebellion by the Krajina Serbs within its own borders. Ethnically homoge-
nous and with no major territorial disputes with its only Yugoslav neighbor, Slovenia 
was much more impatient to get on with its project of full independence. In order 
to achieve independence as soon as possible, the Slovenian government (even more 
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than President Kučan) kept all options open, including one of direct negotiations 
with the Serbs. A permanent threat of a Slovenian unilateral secession by separate 
agreement with Serbia made Croatia suspicious of Slovenia’s real intentions. At one 
moment, the Croatian strategic interest was to slow down Slovenia in its road to 
 independence. This was because Slovenia’s early achievement of independence would 
almost certainly leave Croatia in a more unfavorable and isolated position, in an 
ever more Serb-dominated “rump Yugoslavia.” At the same time, Croatian president 
Tudjman’s bilateral meetings with Serbian president Milošević in the last months 
of 1990 made the Slovenes equally suspicious of Croatia’s real intentions, primar-
ily over Bosnia. Although publicly they continued to cooperate, both republics left 
the doors open for bilateral negotiations with Serbia. The Slovenian-Croatian alli-
ance appeared, in this light, to be a marriage of convenience, where both partners 
were aware of the existence of a third partner—always present as an alternative, and 
 potentially harmful. This impacted negatively upon the further joint promotion of 
the confederal agreement.
Thirdly, there were very significant differences on strategic and tactical issues 
between the major political forces within both republics. In Croatia these differ-
ences were confined to fractional struggles between radical secessionists and moder-
ate confederalists within the ruling Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ). In 
Slovenia they took a more open form of a political conflict between the government 
(the proindependence Demos coalition) and the opposition (the reformed commu-
nists, who favored confederation). These differences were also manifest in occasional 
disputes between the government, led by Christian Democrat Lojze Peterle, and the 
more proconfederationist Slovenian state presidency, led by Milan Kučan, the for-
mer leader of the Slovenian League of Communists. As will be explained later in this 
chapter, some crucial decisions—including, for example, the hasty organization of a 
plebiscite in December 1990—were the direct result of internal party competition in 
Slovenia. The confederalist proposal was never unanimously supported by all major 
forces, either in Slovenia or in Croatia. Divisions between those who argued for full 
independence and those who were prepared to compromise through a confederalist 
proposal disappeared only after national unity in favor of independence had been 
forged as a result of the wars.
Finally, failure of the confederalist proposal in October 1990 could also be 
attributed, at least to some extent, to the lack of support from influential interna-
tional factors. All key international factors that had had a lengthy involvement in 
the Yugoslav crisis favored the preservation of a democratised Yugoslav state. This 
policy was best articulated according to the formula of “a democratic and united 
Yugoslavia” promoted by the U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann,10 
and shared by others. When it appeared, the confederalist proposal was an outright 
challenge to this policy. To international observers it was clear that its authors saw it 
as only an interim arrangement for Yugoslavia that would eventually serve to facili-
tate the full independence of its republics. As such the confederalist proposal was in 
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a sharp contrast with the international support for a united and democratic Yugo-
slav state. A good example of the difference between the dominant views of the key 
international factors and those of Slovenian President Kučan is offered in Warren 
Zimmermann’s description of Kučan’s meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker on June 21, 1990, in Belgrade:
[For Kučan] the question of secession is not whether, but how. . . . Kučan said 
it would be prepared to seek a future community of sovereign Yugoslav nations, 
along the lines of the European Community. I was struck by this reference to the 
EC; it showed that by “confederation,” a term Kučan had used with me just the 
week before, the Slovenes were thinking about themselves as a fully independent 
country rather than as part of a Balkan Switzerland.11
The position of the key international players in the Yugoslav crisis altered only in the 
aftermath of the Slovenian war with the JNA—and only after the Yugoslav state presi-
dency (on July 18, 1991) decided to withdraw the JNA troops from Slovenia. Thus, 
the international policy with regard to Yugoslav unity changed largely in response to 
the concept of a united and democratic Yugoslavia’s being de facto abandoned by the 
informal agreement between the Slovenes and Serbs, making a unilateral secession 
of Slovenia possible. The final attempt to reintroduce the concept of confederation 
was initiated by Croatia through a “five-point plan” conceptualised by the Croatian 
minister of foreign affairs, Davorin Rudolf, in direct response to what seemed to be 
a Slovene-Serb agreement on unilateral secession of Slovenia.12 But at this moment, 
it seemed that the international factors were much more interested in the proposal 
than both Slovenia and (especially) Serbia. In September 1991, a confederation a la 
carte was proposed officially by the International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia 
(via its chairman, Lord Carrington)—but was refused by Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević.13 As memoirs of the main participants from the Slovenian and Croatian 
sides now confirm, Slovenia only reluctantly agreed—perhaps also because it was 
convinced that Serbia never would. In conclusion, the international community sup-
ported the confederal proposal only when it became unrealistic to expect the various 
Yugoslav participants to agree to it.
In the sections that follow I will describe briefly the historical context in which 
the proposal for a confederation was made, discussed, and ultimately rejected. This 
context largely influenced political debates, which were often about the “real mean-
ing” of the concepts, such as “federation” and “confederation.” In addition, histori-
cal arguments were used by relevant political actors in the confederalist-federalist 
debate in 1990, which made them an integral part of the debate we follow in this 
chapter. Consistent with the main argument presented here—that the best (if not 
the only) chance the confederalist proposal had was before the beginning of the use 
of weapons in the Yugoslav crisis (thus, before fall 1990)—the chapter will focus on 
1990, not 1991 when tensions were already so high that no compromise of this sort 
seemed to be possible.
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Confederation Enters
The de facto end of socialist Yugoslavia was signalled on January 22, 1990, when 
in protest the Slovenian delegation walked out of the Fourteenth (Extraordinary) 
Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ). Because socialist Yugo-
slavia was—especially in its last phase, that is, after its last Constitution was enacted 
in 1974—built around its specific ideology, such a prominent display of the failure 
of this ideology meant that the foundations of the Yugoslav state were now badly 
shaken. The SKJ had been the real locus of sovereignty in Yugoslavia. Without the 
SKJ and its ideology of socialist self-management, this highly ideocratic state had 
little chance of surviving.
The question that the Yugoslav political elites now faced was, could Yugoslavia 
survive as a state under some alternative arrangement? Could it successfully accom-
modate to a change of ideology? Or would it instead inevitably disintegrate into its 
constituent parts—six republics, or even further—into many more territories?
The first incentives for a fundamental restructuring of the Yugoslav state had 
already emerged by the mid-1980s, when political elites in Serbia launched several 
initiatives for at first smaller but then more substantial amendments to the 1974 
Constitution. Under the leadership of Ivan Stambolić (1982–87), Serbia became the 
leading force of the “reformers of the Constitution.”14 While the need for smaller 
reforms was accepted by others in Yugoslavia, the majority resisted any attempts to 
reject the main principles of the 1974 Constitution, which further decentralized the 
Yugoslav state and which it described as “neither a federation nor confederation but 
a new form of socio-political community.”15 Slovenian and Croatian political elites 
in the 1980s—together with those of the two provinces of Serbia, Vojvodina, and 
Kosovo—formed an informal block of “the defenders of the Constitution” and suc-
cessfully blocked most of Serbia’s reformist initiatives in the political sphere. Serbia 
soon found itself politically isolated in Yugoslavia. This significantly contributed to 
the failure of Stambolić’s policy of gradual and institutional reforms of the political 
system. At the same time, this also contributed to the rise of Slobodan Milošević 
and his policy of combined institutional and extrainstitutional pressure for constitu-
tional changes. As of 1987, Serbian demands for constitutional and political changes 
 became not only more vocal but also more aggressive. Milošević interpreted the 1974 
Constitution as being too confederalist and thus becoming the main generator of 
the disintegrative trends in Yugoslav politics. The “antibureaucratic revolution” he 
launched in 1988 demanded a new constitution that would have abandoned all ele-
ments of confederalism while promoting unity. In his public discourse, Milošević 
still used the concept of federalism to describe this new, recentralized, Yugoslavia. 
At the same time, however, the concept he used more than any other in his speeches 
between 1984 and 1989 was unity.16
Other republics, then still largely committed to the rhetoric of Yugoslav socialism 
(that identified “unitarism” as one of its main political enemies) viewed Milošević as 
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a unitarist and thus as a serious danger for the fragile compromise of the 1974 politi-
cal and constitutional arrangement. The political elites of Slovenia, Croatia, Kosovo, 
and Vojvodina now argued that Milošević’s politics meant a return to the old days 
of statist socialism or even Stalinism. They argued that the “federalism” of Milošević 
was not really federalism but in fact was a mask for unitarism. On March 28, 1989, 
Milošević promulgated the new constitution of Serbia. The Slovenian and Croatian 
elites viewed this as a victory for his unitarist concept because it significantly reduced 
the autonomy of the two Serbian autonomous provinces—Vojvodina and Kosovo. 
Furthermore, in April 1989, Milošević made clear that he did not intend to stop at 
the borders of his own republic; he was prepared to try to “unite” Yugoslavia, too.
Those who expect that now, when she has finally become a Republic, that Serbia 
would join the defenders of the status quo and oppose changes to the 1974 Con-
stitution, are deluding themselves. They will soon have a chance to see how wrong 
they are. Serbia did not become a state to sleep on the wreath of glory, but—now 
strong and open towards others—to forcefully initiate democratic changes in order 
to make Yugoslavia a strong community of equal nations and nationalities. . . . Of 
course, those who do not care for Yugoslavia claim that our intentions and plans 
are “unitarist” and “hegemonistic.” But they should be under no illusion that we 
would . . . abandon Yugoslavia and socialism.17
The Slovenian and Croatian political elites in particular understood this as an open 
threat. In response, they now moved toward one single objective: to defend (and if 
possible to expand further) the level of autonomy of their republics within Yugo-
slavia. The arrangements of the 1974 Constitution now became a “bottom line,” a 
line past which the Slovenian and Croatian elites were not prepared to negotiate. 
Because the 1974 Constitution could only be changed by a consensus of all Yugo-
slav republics and provinces, the defenders of the constitution had, at least for the 
time being, the upper hand.
However, Milošević’s antibureaucratic revolution in Serbia had already de 
facto changed the status quo—first through a combination of public protests and 
intrainstitutional pressure against the “defenders of the constitution” in Vojvodina 
(in October 1988) and then in Montenegro (in January 1989). In February 1989 
the federal state introduced a state of emergency in Kosovo. These acts—as well as 
the announcement that the antibureaucratic revolution might soon be “exported” to 
Slovenia and Croatia—were seen by these two northern republics as illegal. This was 
because they fundamentally sought to undermine the constitutional arrangements 
for republican and provincial autonomy.
In spring 1989 Serbia announced trade sanctions against Slovenia (in response 
to Slovenian criticism of Serbia’s policy toward Kosovo). The Slovenian political elite 
concluded that the 1974 Constitution had de facto ceased to exist. Subsequently, 
the Slovenian elite abandoned the policy of status quo as no longer realistic. The 
situation in which this happened is described by Janez Drnovšek, who was the first 
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non-Communist president of Yugoslavia’s state presidency, elected by the Slovenian 
electorate to represent the republic in this body as of May 1989:
The actual situation had already moved forward so much that it was impossible to 
deal with it within the framework of the existing constitution, as this constitution 
was now completely lagging behind reality of the day. . . . It now became impos-
sible to respect the law in the strict sense, as the new political and economic reali-
ties were now completely different from the self-managed, socialist, party state. At 
the same time, the argument that no law should be obeyed any more, that nothing 
was worth preserving, was also unacceptable—as it would lead to a complete chaos 
and would thus open the floodgate to this or that form of violence.18
Once Slovenia agreed that the old constitution was no longer viable, the Yugoslav 
presidency initiated, in January 1990, a debate on the new constitution. As Janez 
Drnovšek admits in his political memoirs, hopes that the Yugoslav republics would 
ever agree on a meaningful text of the new constitution were very weak.19 It was 
 obvious that the Slovenian and Serbian political objectives were worlds apart. Slove-
nia’s main objective was to preserve—and, if possible, to extend—the level of auton-
omy that had been instituted by the 1974 Constitution. According to the letter of 
the 1974 Constitution, all republics were recognized as “sovereign states”—but due 
to the nature of Communist ideology and politics this phrase had little substance. 
In the new, post-Communist circumstances, the Slovenian elite sought to give sub-
stance to the phrase.
Having little hope for an agreement with other republics, the Slovenian politi-
cians were now increasingly looking toward their own republic. The reforms launched 
within Slovenia included a series of constitutional amendments to the constitution 
of the republic, all of them aiming to further expand on Slovenian sovereignty.20 
Although the concept of sovereignty was not yet defined as full state independence, 
that is, as creation of a separate Slovenian state outside of Yugoslavia, this option 
was no longer unthinkable. The right to self-determination—on which Slovenian 
politicians insisted—clearly meant also the right to secede from Yugoslavia should 
the Slovenes so wish.
As the Yugoslav constitutional debate wore on, the Slovenes’ position was to 
insist that Yugoslavia would remain acceptable to Slovenia only if further decentral-
ization was carried out. On this basis, Slovenian politicians in 1989–90 objected 
not only to Milošević’s attempt to recentralize Yugoslavia but also to large extent to 
proposals for political reforms promoted by Ante Marković, the new federal Prime 
Minister.21 Marković (a Bosnian-born Croat representing Croatia) was a Yugoslav 
federalist and thus more popular in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia and among 
 minorities (for example, Croatian Serbs) than among “sovereignists,” such as Milošević 
and Kučan. Ljubljana supported Marković’s economic reforms but was much more 
sceptical about his program of political reforms, which included federal-wide elec-
tions and thus the creation of a Yugoslav demos to supplement (and perhaps supplant) 
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the republican demos.22 As both Milošević and Marković used the concept of fed-
eralism to describe their program of reforms, the Slovenian political establishment 
now gradually moved away from this concept and introduced confederalism into 
the debate in order to emphasize the difference.
The introduction of the confederalist concept was a last-minute attempt of 
 Slovenian reformed Communists to endear themselves to the Slovenian elector-
ate. At one of its last sessions (on March 7–8, 1990), only a month before the 
first democratic elections, the outgoing Slovenian parliament (still controlled by 
reformed Communists) requested from its executive council (i.e., Slovenian gov-
ernment) to prepare a draft of a confederal treaty that would be offered to other 
Yugoslav republics instead of a new Yugoslav constitution. By the end of April the 
draft that emerged as a result of this initiative was discussed at the very last session 
of the outgoing government. The Šinigoj proposal—as the document was named 
after the outgoing prime minister, Dušan Šinigoj—went almost unnoticed by the 
general public. Soon after the change of government, the Šinigoj proposal was (at 
least temporarily) placed ad acta.23
Although fairly noncommittal when it came to political solutions, the Šinigoj 
proposal was very useful for its cost-benefit analysis of economic implications of 
 Slovenian eventual secession from Yugoslavia.24 The document prepared by the 
 Slovenian Institute for social planning analyzed the structure of Slovenian trade and 
discovered that in 1988, 51.9 percent of all goods and services produced in Slovenia 
were sold within the republic, 30.1 percent in other Yugoslav republics, and 18 per-
cent of total trade was realized through export to the international market. The main 
area of trade for Slovenian goods in Yugoslavia was Croatia (9.8 percent of the total), 
followed by Serbia in its territory outside of the two provinces (6.1 percent), and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (3.3 percent). The figures on import to Slovenia showed that 
57 percent of it originated from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, more than 
half of Slovenian trade with other Yugoslav republics was with Croatia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Because Slovenia did not expect these two republics to join Serbia in 
its trade boycott (even in the case of Slovenia’s secession), the damage to Slovenian 
economic interests would be limited.
The estimation presented to the Slovenian government indicated that in the 
worst case scenario—that is, if all other Yugoslav republics cut off their trade with 
Slovenia for political reasons—Slovenian GDP would immediately shrink by 
37.3 percent. But if Serbia remained the only republic whose market would be lost, 
the Slovenian GDP would decrease by not more than 15.3 percent of the total. 
In short, experts offered an analysis that looked less bleak than politicians were 
led to believe by their own instinct or international warnings. Slovenia’s strategic 
interest was to deter any other republic in Yugoslavia from joining Serbia in its 
trade boycott. For this reason, Slovenia had to be seen to be doing its best to con-
tribute to a peaceful resolution of the Yugoslav crisis rather than acting in what 
could be perceived to be an extremist and unilateral manner. If seen as reasonable 
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and cooperative, Slovenia could perhaps even reverse negative trends by reorient-
ing some other republics from being linked with Serbia to itself in an economic 
and political sense.25
Analysis prepared for Šinigoj’s government predicted that the most difficult 
aspect of confederalization would be in the sphere of military reforms—not least 
because of deep animosities developed within the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) for 
Slovenian political reforms. These animosities began in the mid-1980s when Slove-
nian liberalized media protested against the JNA policy of treating only Serbo-Croat 
as its de facto official language—and thus ignoring the constitutional status of the 
Slovenian (and Macedonian) language as official in Yugoslavia. They further deepened 
when the Slovenian weekly Mladina published articles on corruption within the JNA 
and criticized the army for its close links with dictatorial regimes in Africa. In 1988 
the JNA arrested and tried three Slovenian journalists (including Janez Janša) and 
one noncommissioned officer in Ljubljana. The relationship with the JNA worsened 
when in the last months of 1989 Slovenia refused to agree on the federal budget for 
1990—of which the JNA was the main beneficiary. In a document submitted to 
the government by the Slovenian Territorial Defence Headquarters (RŠTO), mili-
tary experts proposed three alternatives for organization of the defence forces in an 
eventual confederation. First, the Yugoslav army might remain the only armed force 
in confederation but must be restructured in such a way that most of its units were 
territorial, that is, clearly associated with a particular republic. The second option 
allowed for a combination of a professional (thus, not conscript-based) Yugoslav 
army and a separate armed forces of the republics. This proposal was in line with the 
dual structure of the existing Yugoslav defence system, which consisted of the JNA 
and territorial defence forces. However, in practice the JNA remained overwhelm-
ingly the more important of the two components. In addition, the federal secretary 
of defence, General Veljko Kadijević, launched an initiative in spring 1990 to abol-
ish territorial defence units, which he saw as potentially too nationalistic and thus 
dangerous for Yugoslav unity.26 Just before the elections in Slovenia and Croatia, 
the Yugoslav Army removed much of the weaponry from the depots of territorial 
defence units and transferred them to the JNA depots—especially in Croatia.27 The 
reforms proposed by the JNA were in direct conflict with those now considered by 
the Slovenian government. This was especially the case with the third option of the 
Šinigoj confederal proposal: that the defence forces of the confederation should con-
sist of separate armies of the republics without the confederal army. In practice, this 
would have meant the end of the JNA as an institution.
As events would soon demonstrate, the JNA did not forget this proposal—which 
would, if accepted, have made it “an army without a state,” as the federal secretary 
of defence, Veljko Kadijević, described it.28 As these options were proposed by the 
Slovenian Communist government, the JNA became convinced that no political 
party in Slovenia could be its potential ally. Thus, any attempt to negotiate with the 
Slovenes would probably be futile. The conflict between the JNA and the Slovenes 
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continued throughout 1990 and 1991—escalating during the brief but violent “Ten 
Days War” between the JNA and Slovenia in June and July 1991.
Slovenia after the 1990 elections
Slovenia was the first republic in Yugoslavia to hold democratic, multiparty elec-
tions. A decision to open up political competition to non-Communist groups and 
parties was a direct consequence of five major influences that Slovenian reformed 
Communists could no longer ignore. First, by January 1990 the SKJ had de facto 
ceased to exist. Therefore, the Slovenian elite was no longer obliged by the principle 
of democratic centralism to support policy decisions over which it no longer had 
any decisive influence. Second, it was now recognized that the Yugoslav constitution 
was de facto suspended (the Slovenes argued that this was brought on by unilateral 
changes introduced by Serbia) and that the political system of self-management had 
come to an end. Third, the Slovenian political elite sought to demonstrate its popular 
legitimacy, which was contested by Serbia. The “anti-bureaucratic revolutionaries” 
claimed that—unlike Milošević, who obviously had a large number of active followers 
willing to organize massive rallies in his support—the Slovenian leaders spoke only 
for themselves and not for the people. Fourth, by being the first Yugoslav republic 
to organize multiparty elections, Slovenia hoped it would be seen as the most pro-
gressive and most democratic in the eyes of the Western world. This would enable 
the Slovenes to claim that the conflict in Yugoslavia was primarily fought between 
the forces of democratization (i.e., Slovenia and Croatia) and the forces of dogmatic 
antidemocratic neo-Stalinism (in Serbia and perhaps other republics). Slovenia (and 
Croatia) now portrayed themselves as the “Yugoslav west” and thus the main poten-
tial ally of the West.29 Finally, the Slovenian reformed Communists were facing (by 
1990) already very strong and growing unofficial opposition in Slovenia.
The first opposition groups in Slovenia emerged in 1986 and were largely 
 organized around two institutions. The former Socialist Youth Organization (ZSMS) 
offered its institutional protection to various liberal, anarchist, pacifist, and other 
alternative groups, whereas the Slovenian Writers’ Association and its journal Nova 
Revija became the main institutional locus for anti-Communist intellectuals of dif-
ferent political orientations, from liberals to separatists.30 These two institutions—
 especially the latter—became vocal critics of Communist policy in the second half 
of the 1980s, whether it was Yugoslav, Serbian, or Slovenian.
In what is today recognized as a landmark event for Slovenian politics, in January 
1987, the editors of Nova Revija (Niko Grafenauer and Dimitrij Rupel) published a 
special issue (No. 57) of this journal titled Contributions to the Slovene National Pro-
gram. In one article after another, the leading anti-Communist intellectuals argued 
that Yugoslavia had become a burden on weak Slovenian shoulders and that the 
 Slovenes should consider making their own, independent state. “Yugoslavism” and 
“Yugoslavianism” (the former referring to an attempt to create a Yugoslav ethnic, 
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the latter to the Yugoslav civil nation) were identified as the main dangers facing the 
existence of Slovenian national identity.31 Most authors in the special issue argued in 
favor of a fully independent Slovenian state and defined their role as one of convinc-
ing the Slovenian public that independence was a viable option and should be the 
primary aim, ranked higher than either socialism or Yugoslavia. In their subsequent 
writings, the Nova Revija authors became the main promoters of Slovenian indepen-
dence. By 1989, one of them, Ivan Urbančič, concluded: “Yugoslavia as a state is a 
historical accident; it is without any indigenous imperative, without any idea of itself. 
Yugoslavia cannot exist, because she does not have any interior necessity.”32
Faced with the uncertainties and offered an alternative to the long-standing 
crisis of Yugoslavia, Slovenian public opinion was now rapidly moving in support 
of independence. Already in 1987, 53 percent of the respondents in a survey con-
ducted by the University of Ljubljana claimed that outside Yugoslavia, as an inde-
pendent state, “Slovenia would increase its chances to develop in an economic sense,” 
whereas only 18.9 percent claimed the contrary. More respondents than ever before 
(43.2 percent) claimed that Slovenian politics was “not sufficiently independent.”33 
In addition, the LCY was rapidly losing its appeal with the Slovenian electorate. In 
1986, only 18 percent of Slovenes agreed that “the LCY needs to exist no longer.” 
By May 1989, 53.3 percent of the population shared this view. The May 1989 sur-
vey discovered that 75.1 percent of the Slovenian population favored multiparty 
democracy to a single-party state.34
In response to this change, several newly created opposition parties formed in 
December 1989 a forum-style coalition Demos. At the elections for three chambers 
of the Slovenian parliament, the parties of the Demos had won 54 percent of the 
votes, that is, 123 of 240 seats. Lojze Peterle, the leader of the Slovenian Christian 
Democrats (SKD), became the first non-Communist prime minister, and the editor-
in-chief of Nova Revija, Dimitrij Rupel became the foreign minister. At the same 
time, however, the reformed Communists were more successful at the elections for 
the Slovenian state presidency—the collective head of the state. Milan Kučan was 
elected its president (having won 58.3 percent of the vote, to 41.7 percent for the 
Demos representative, Jože Pučnik), while the reformed Communists had two more 
members—thus a majority of 3 votes to 2. This created grounds for a cohabitation 
between the reformed Communists and the Demos.
These two main political forces in the new Slovenian politics had, however, very 
different views on the future of Slovenian relationship with other Yugoslav republics. 
Milan Kučan was at that time still a confederalist who claimed to be an opponent of 
Slovenian separatism.35 But he was under heavy pressure from many quarters (public 
opinion, federal institutions, opposition in Slovenia, the JNA, the Serbian leadership, 
the international community) at a time when his political world was falling apart. 
Describing his feelings immediately after he decided to lead the Slovenian Commu-
nists out of the Fourteenth SKJ Congress in January 1990, Kučan revealed some of 
the dilemmas he was facing at the time:
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All my life, and especially my youth, was linked with the Party. I have been influ-
enced by these ideas through my family, and even if the Party is now clearly not what 
it once was, it is still not easy to say goodbye. . . . I can hardly even think about the 
possibility of Slovenia leaving Yugoslavia. Personally, I have never been for it. I can-
not come to terms with this possibility. But, Yugoslavia as it is now is good for no 
one. If the Helsinki Declaration and the way of thinking in Europe, which is now 
hostile to any amendments of the borders, change—and I am not sure that Europe 
will remain committed to this view after all that has happened in Germany and in 
the countries of the East—then we Slovenian non-separatists would face a very dif-
ficult situation. Of course, it all depends on what Yugoslavia would look like.36
From this perspective, the new Slovenian president viewed the confederal proposal 
primarily as a means of preserving the Yugoslav name in some form—while the new 
government understood it as the first step toward full independence. These differ-
ences caused permanent tensions between Milan Kučan and the government of Lojze 
Peterle, with Kučan remaining skeptical about the feasibility of the quick and often 
impatient moves initiated by the majority in the Slovenian parliament. For Kučan, 
who was to some extent a political offspring of Edvard Kardelj and his vision of an 
ever more decentralized Yugoslavia, confederation was perhaps also a further step 
toward this permanent decentralization in new, changed circumstances.37 For the 
Demos, however, confederation was possible only as a radical turnabout from Com-
munism and various political and social experiments that came with it.
From a distance, primarily from Belgrade, Slovenia looked united behind the 
nationalist program. To Milošević and the JNA, there seemed to be little difference 
between Kučan and the Demos. This view was, however, a gross misinterpretation 
of reality. A new, postelectoral political system in Slovenia was truly pluralistic—to 
such an extent that it was sometimes very difficult to reconcile differences. Ten-
sions between the government and the president continued over the whole period 
of transition from Yugoslavia to an independent Slovenian state. These tensions 
largely determined the dynamics of the key decisions in Slovenian politics in 1990 
and 1991. Due to his previous role in the liberalization of Slovenian politics and to 
his resistance to the forces of centralism in Yugoslavia, President Kučan remained 
personally popular and influential. However, Slovenia was a parliamentary, not a 
presidential, democracy, and the Demos had full control over the first democratic 
parliament. The Demos used this institutional advantage to impose laws and enforce 
decisions that would lead to full independence. The Slovenian government practically 
ignored the president’s confederalist approach and opted for full independence. In 
this, the government was supported by circumstances, which made a compromise 
in Yugoslavia very difficult or, perhaps, completely impossible.
Croatia Following the Elections of April 1990
Yugoslav politics during the late 1980s was characterized by a polarization between 
the Slovenian and Serbian visions of the future of Yugoslavia. Although more sup-
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portive of the Slovenes than of the Serbs, Croatian political leaders tried to promote 
a compromise rather than to place themselves openly in support of the Slovenes, 
against the Serbs. The Communist elite was aware that a strong anti-Serb position 
could result in a worsening of interethnic (Croat-Serb) relations in Croatia. How-
ever, such a reserved policy gave the impression of a weakness in Croatian politics. 
 Croatian nationalism grew in response both to this perceived weakness of the Croatian 
Communists in the 1980s and to the expansionist character of Serbian nationalism. 
An increasing number of Croats saw the expansionist Serbs as serious and realistic 
threat. The Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)—a radical nationalist party 
lead by Franjo Tudjman—emerged in February 1989 in direct response to the 
“policy of appeasement with Serbia,” as Tudjman characterized the line taken by 
the Croatian reformed Communists. In criticizing Croatia’s political elite, Tudjman 
often pointed out that the Croatian Communists should follow the example of their 
Slovenian comrades (if not that of the Demos), who strongly resisted attempts to 
recentralize Yugoslavia.
The Slovenian position on decentralizing Yugoslavia was popular in Croatia. In 
a series of public opinion surveys that I conducted for the leading Croatian political 
weekly Danas on March 19–21, 1990 (thus only three weeks before the elections), 
it was revealed that a large number of Croats were in favor of Yugoslavia being trans-
formed into a confederation. The confederation was supported by 52 percent of the 
respondents in Zagreb, 48 percent in Rijeka, and 47 percent in Split. At the same 
time, 25 percent of the electorate in Zagreb, 26 percent in Split, and 13 percent 
in Rijeka favored full independence—with no confederal or any other formal links 
with other Yugoslav republics. The “reformed federation” (which for the Croats was 
mostly associated with Ante Marković, not Slobodan Milošević) was supported by 
24 percent in Zagreb, 27 percent in Split, and 37 percent in Rijeka. The same sur-
vey, however, revealed that 54 percent of the HDZ voters preferred secession to any 
other option. The HDZ voters preferred to define Croatia in constitutional terms as 
“the nation-state of the Croats” (61 percent), thus omitting any reference to other 
ethnic groups. Unlike them, the voters for the centrist political parties preferred 
confederation to secession, whereas the supporters of the reformed Communists 
preferred federation (64 percent) to confederation. Therefore, at the moment of the 
first Croatian multiparty elections in 1990, the HDZ had yet to secure a majority 
for its preferred option: the full independence of Croatia.
It is within this context that one should understand Tudjman’s hesitation to 
openly promote secessionist ideas prior to the first Croatian elections. As the project 
of a confederation had already been a part of the public debate in Slovenia, the Croa-
tian and Yugoslav authorities could not blame the HDZ for being too extreme. The 
HDZ voters—more radical than the majority of the Croats—accepted the concept 
of confederation as a “public talk” in a situation in which it was illegal and politi-
cally damaging to promote secessionism. But it is fair to say that by confederation 
they did not understand an attempt to reform or save Yugoslavia in any form but 
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an important further step on the road to independence. While the reformed Com-
munists opted for “modern federation” as their main political program in 1990, the 
HDZ was now offering something new, more clearly distinguishable from the Serbs 
and federal government, and closer to the Slovenes—confederation. The party’s 
 position was expressed succinctly by Tudjman thus: “On the whole, there is no major 
difference between the program promoted by Slovenian politicians and that which 
is favored by the HDZ. . . . I am not saying that this is the end of any Yugoslavia. I 
am only saying that this is the end of Yugoslavism as a form of compulsory brother-
hood, to which we would no longer be slaves. I am also saying that this is the end of 
the policy of preservation of Yugoslavia at any cost.”38
The HDZ emerged as the sole winner of the 1990 elections. Although it did 
not receive more than 42 percent of all votes cast, due to the nature of the Croatian 
electoral system (“first past the post”), the HDZ received 58 percent of seats in all 
three chambers of Croatian parliament, the Sabor.39 Unlike Slovenia, there was no 
cohabitation—the HDZ majority in the Sabor elected Franjo Tudjman president 
of the Croatian state presidency. In the euphoria that followed the historic (and, to 
many, the unexpected)40 victory of the Croatian nationalists, Tudjman (and even 
more—members and supporters of his party) now saw the electoral victory as giv-
ing them carte blanche. They proceeded to exclude all other political groups from 
 decision-making. In a way similar to that of the Slovenian intellectuals in the mid-
1980s, the HDZ now wanted to increase public support for independence.
In one of its first foreign-policy steps after the elections, the new Croatian gov-
ernment officially approached the Slovenian government (and President Kučan) in 
order to coordinate further actions against their common opponent: centralizing 
forces in Serbia and in Yugoslav federal politics. In his inaugural speech in the Sabor 
made on May 30, 1990, Franjo Tudjman announced the new policy:
Because of the fact that Croatia is a part of Yugoslavia, which is a recognized member 
of international order, we are prepared to enter negotiations with representatives of 
other nations of the SFR Yugoslavia and its federal bodies, in order to draft a new 
contractual settlement for our mutual relationships. Based on historical experience, 
we believe that the state sovereignty of Croatia—together with sovereignty of other 
nations of the current Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—can be secured only 
on the basis of confederation as a contractual association of sovereign states.41
According to Mario Nobilo, the Croatian side began working on the confederal 
proposal on July 20, 1990, only a month and a half into the mandate of the first 
Croatian post-Communist government, led by Stjepan Mesić. The initial idea was 
to create a long strategic document on the future of Croatia and its possible links 
with other republics, as well as the actual confederal contract.42 But the Croats soon 
discovered that there was no time for such a megaproject. The paradox of the new 
Croatian politics was that at the same time that Croatia began to coordinate its poli-
tics with Slovenia it also wanted to slow down Slovenia’s secession from Yugoslavia 
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because it was aware that Slovenia’s unilateral secession would reduce Croatia’s 
chances to achieve independence on its own. Croatia feared that a Slovenian seces-
sion would turn the remaining “Yugoslavia” into a Serb-dominated country. Croatia 
was supportive of Slovenia’s independence only if it was the result of the complete 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, which would then pave the way for Croatia’s complete 
independence. Otherwise, the secession of Slovenia would be a part of the problem, 
not a solution.43
In addition, the now increasingly nationalistic (anti-Serb) Croatian elite feared 
that Slovenia would conclude a political pact with Serbia based on mutual recog-
nition of the right to self-determination. This pact would allow Slovenia to leave 
Yugoslavia but would in turn also recognize the rights of the Serbs in other former 
Yugoslav republics to remain united with Serbia in one country. In several public 
speeches, Serbian politicians hinted that they would not object to such a deal. For 
example, in his inaugural speech on May 15, 1990, Borisav Jović, the new president 
of Yugoslavia’s state presidency, announced his intention to enact the law on secession. 
As his political diary (published in 1995) testifies, at one of his private discussions 
with Slobodan Milošević (on June 28, 1990), Milošević proposed to “cut Croatia 
down the middle,” with areas where the ethnic Serbs formed a majority remaining 
“on our side.” Jović was then instructed to come up with developed proposals at the 
forthcoming sessions of the Yugoslav state presidency—“within a week, at most.”44 
On July 23, 1990, while visiting Slovenia, Jović confirmed that “it would be pos-
sible for some republics to secede.” In his memoirs, Janez Drnovšek also states that 
in “informal conversations we had in August 1990, Jović and Milošević said they 
had absolutely nothing against Slovenian independence—on the contrary, they 
thought Slovenes should organize a referendum and make a decision.”45 According to 
Drnovšek, occasionally even General Kadijević was not entirely hostile to Slovenia’s 
leaving Yugoslavia but “only by agreement with others in Yugoslav federation.” “He 
believed that the federation could survive the secession of Slovenia, but Croatia was 
a different thing. Independence of Croatia would mean a civil war—because of Serb 
minorities in Croatia. In that case, Bosnia-Herzegovina would become a problem 
too. He said that the Yugoslav Army would not allow this to happen.”46
In later interpretations of the reasons why Slovenia did not accept such a “gen-
erous” Serbian offer (at least not prior to July 1991), four possible reasons were 
stated. First, Slovenia did not trust Milošević and thought his offer was only a tactical 
 manoeuvre that—if accepted—would only reveal the secessionist nature of Slove-
nian politics. Second, Slovenia was not ready for independence. Not only was public 
opinion still divided over the issue,47 but some Slovenian leaders (for example, Milan 
Kučan) were still genuinely sentimental about Yugoslavia. Others believed Slovenia 
was not yet in a position to implement policies leading to full independence.48 Third, 
there was no international support for Slovenian independence at that time. On the 
contrary, at all official talks the Slovenian leaders had with foreign officials before July 
1991, they were warned clearly that no European state would recognize a secessionist 
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republic.49 Finally, by accepting the Serbian offer of unilateral secession, the Slovenes 
would disturb bilateral relationship with all other Yugoslav republics, including the 
only ally they had at the time—Croatia. They feared Milošević would use Slovenian 
secession to consolidate his gains and defeat Croatia—but only to proceed further by 
trying to force a quasi-independent (but unrecognized) Slovenia into submission.50
In addition, the Slovenes did not want to take responsibility for the destruc-
tion of Yugoslavia. Through cooperation with Croatia they could successfully reject 
accusations that it was only they who were dissatisfied with federalism in Yugoslavia. 
At the same time, the confederalist proposal would portray Slovenia as a construc-
tive and cooperative republic. As Milan Kučan explained in a speech to the Slove-
nian parliament on July 18, 1990: “If all these democratic attempts for an adequate 
 solution come to nothing, and if we are left with no other option but to secede, then 
we must justify it in such a clear way that the outside world is completely convinced 
that we have had no other option.”51
It was for these—primarily tactical—reasons that Slovenia agreed to the 
Croatian initiative for a joint confederal proposal. But it is important to note two 
key factors that subsequently influenced the destiny of the proposal. First, that 
this acceptance was given hesitantly, and second, that for Slovenia (and to a lesser 
extent also for Croatia52) there always was an alternative—a separate deal with 
Serbia. A part of the problem in the relationship between the two partners in this 
marriage of convenience was the almost incompatible personal characters of two 
(or possibly, with Lojze Peterle, three) leaders: Milan Kučan and Franjo Tudjman. 
While Kučan had a long and distinguished career in Slovenian and federal institu-
tions, Tudjman was expelled from the SKJ in 1967 and even sentenced to prison 
on two occasions in the 1970s and 1980s. Kučan was a pragmatic leader, whereas 
Tudjman was inclined to “historicise” at official meetings—to the irritation of his 
visitors.53 More importantly, Tudjman believed that the Serbs and Croats (not the 
Slovenes) held the key to the solution of the Yugoslav crisis. He criticized the Croa-
tian Communists for allowing an “unnatural” situation in which the main conflict 
was between Slovenia and Serbia—with Croatia being entirely absent. Once in 
power, he “did not hide ambitions to become the leader of all endangered Yugoslav 
nations in their joint defence against the Greater-Serbian menace,” as his intentions 
were described by Peter Potočnik, the chief Zagreb correspondent of the Slovenian 
daily newspapers, Delo:
Dr Franjo Tudjman, who in his book Wastelands of Historical Reality criticised 
Slovenes for their history of plotting with Serbs against Croats and for not relying 
on Croats in Yugoslavia, said a month ago that for the democratic world Croatia 
was much more important than Slovenia, and that Slovenia lost its leading role 
in democratization of Yugoslavia after Croatian elections. When they mention a 
phrase “Croatia and Slovenia,” the Croats assume that Slovenia is only an appen-
dix to Croatia . . .54
13.Jovic.indd   266 10/3/07   2:14:20 PM
The Slovenian-Croatian Confederal Proposal       u       267
The Slovenes were by now becoming increasingly alarmed by Tudjman’s initiatives. 
They could not agree to become junior partners to the Croats—especially because 
they had rejected the status of junior partners to Serbs in Yugoslavia. The more 
 Tudjman insisted on his leadership in the confederalist project, the more reserved 
the Slovenian government was about it.
One more element of Croatian politics alarmed Slovenian politicians: its ambi-
tion to change borders—especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Franjo Tudjman opened 
the issue of Croatia’s borders in his main preelection TV interview when he pointed 
at the map on the wall behind him saying that “as everyone can see,” these borders 
were “clearly unnatural.” In his interview with Danas he went further:
The borders were first contested by those who have led the anti-bureaucratic revolu-
tion. These people brought the country into the stage of disintegration. It was only 
then that the HDZ said: gentlemen in the country and in the world, the Croat 
nation cannot be reduced within such unnatural borders, because these borders 
had been created in the times of the Turkish expansion, and have remained the 
same until today, regardless of the fact that all colonial empires in the world have 
long disappeared. We have, therefore, placed the issue of the borders on the agenda 
only when we were threatened by the idea of their reshaping in Yugoslavia, and for 
us this question exists only in this context.55
In a later interview with Der Spiegel in June 1990, Tudjman linked the confedera-
tion proposal with his notion of a need for changed borders. He said that if Yugo-
slavia was to be transformed into a confederation, Croatia would seek to establish 
its “natural and historical borders.”56 According to a public opinion survey of 
March 19–21, 1990, the large majority of the Croatian electorate wanted the bor-
der of Croatia to remain unchanged: 66 percent of respondents in Split, 69 percent 
in Zagreb, and 78 percent in Rijeka. In favor of the change of the borders were 
15 percent of respondents in Rijeka, 27 percent in Zagreb, and 31 percent in Split. 
However, the HDZ voters were again much more radical—54 percent of them 
wanted the borders to be changed so that they would include parts of Bosnia-
 Herzegovina and possibly Herceg Novi and Boka Kotorska in Montenegro.57 In 
addition, Croats from Herzegovina simply could not imagine a proper state border 
between them and the Republic of Croatia.58 To many of them, confederation was 
possible only if the borders would change because they would not agree to remain 
a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the Croats were the smallest of three con-
stituent ethnic groups.
Slovenian politicians believed that Tudjman’s attempt to open the issue of 
borders was playing with fire.59 Not only did they have no interest in this, but they 
openly opposed it. Tudjman’s nationalism strengthened secessionist forces in Slovenia, 
who on July 2, 1990, successfully rushed the declaration on sovereignty through the 
Slovenian parliament. Without any previous announcement the Slovenian parlia-
ment withdrew its representatives from Federal Parliament (with 131 votes for, 49 
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against, and 21 abstentions) and declared that federal laws and directives would be 
valid in Slovenia only if confirmed by Slovenian institutions.60 In response to this, 
Croatia practically abandoned its original idea of drafting a long strategic document 
on Croatia’s relationship with others, presenting instead on July 20 a shorter, nine-
point proposal that in fact stated Croatia’s expectations of the confederal agreement. 
For Croatia to agree to it, a confederal arrangement should include:
a) recognition of its sovereignty and its borders; b) reciprocal treatment of minori-
ties; c) balanced approached to issue of financial contributions to the costs of con-
federation; d) republics should give guarantees that they would accept servicing 
the existing external debt of Yugoslavia; e) fair division of property of federal insti-
tutions whose existence would not continue; f ) the institutions of confederations 
should be dispersed throughout the “union of the states”; g) republics should have 
their own national guards, while recruits should be posted to units in their own 
republics only. Only elite units of the armed forces should be joint at the level of 
the union, and NATO structure should be mirrored in terms of joint command 
over them; h) obligatory financing of under-developed republics and provinces 
should be stopped; i) the budget for the army should be drastically reduced, and 
the army should be de-politicized.61
In addition, Croatian leadership, as Mario Nobilo confirms, sent a message to Serbia 
that Croatia “was ready not to insist on the preservation of the autonomy for Kosovo 
and Vojvodina, so that it could avoid a reciprocal demand for the same minority 
rights in Croatia.”62 Such a proposal, however, had little positive and much negative 
effect. First of all, its economic side—expressed in points c), d), and e)—meant less 
solidarity with underdeveloped republics, such as Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
and Montenegro and with the province of Kosovo. As expected, this was not wel-
comed by these regions—which could be potential allies and partners in Croatian 
and Slovenian efforts to create a confederation. Second, the proposal for army reforms 
went against everything the army wanted. Finally, the statement on Kosovo was not 
received well by Kosovo’s Albanians. In a letter sent to Tudjman and Kučan on Octo-
ber 13, 1990, “500 Albanian journalists from Kosovo” complained about what they 
saw as backstabbing: “If in your model of confederal agreement there is no space for 
the Republic of Kosovo, then the Albanian nation will accept the third possibility, i.e. 
the full secession from Yugoslavia, based on the same principle you allegedly advo-
cate: right to self-determination. . . . There can be no confederal Yugoslavia without 
recognition of the Albanian Republic of Kosovo as the second Albanian state in the 
Balkans. What can happen, however, is disintegration and war.”63
Croatia’s promise not to interfere in Serbia’s internal affairs did not impress Ser-
bian politicians much either. They believed Croatia could not—even if it wanted to—
interfere in Serbian politics. In addition, any coalition between Croatia and Kosovo 
would only help them to galvanize Serbs in their opposition to Croatia. Croatia’s 
nine-points proposal was entirely unacceptable to Serbia in almost all aspects because 
it ran entirely against Serbia’s own proposals for the recentralization of Yugoslavia. 
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Confederation was the least desirable option, which—as Borisav Jović and Slobodan 
Milošević concluded even before the Croatian elections—“nobody could impose on 
Serbia.” Serbia believed that by this proposal Yugoslavia would cease to exist, and 
Serbs would remain unprotected in other republics, especially in Croatia: “Even if 
we all accept such a contract, the Serbs would still be outsmarted in other areas—so 
we have no reason to accept a confederation.”64
Instead, Serbian leadership supported a quid pro quo policy and now increasingly 
instrumentalized the Serb ethnic group in Croatia in order to undermine Tudjman’s 
government from within. Any further steps on Croatia’s part toward confederation 
or secession would now be met with equal steps by Croatian Serbs (primarily those 
in the Krajina region). As Jovan Rašković, the leader of the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS) in Croatia explained in his interview for the New York Times: “If Croats want 
their own state, then the Serbs too want to decide for themselves whether they want 
to stay in Croatia or to separate from it.”65
Based on this approach, municipalities with ethnic Serb majorities in Croatia 
enacted their own declaration of sovereignty and autonomy of the Serbs in Croa-
tia on the same day (July 25, 1990) that the Croatian parliament enacted twelve 
amendments to the Croatian constitution.66 Finally, tensions in Croatia escalated by 
mid August—in part as a direct consequence of Serbia’s policy of “cutting Croatia 
down the middle” but also in response to ever more radical Croatian nationalism.67 
On August 17, the self-declared Krajina region physically separated from the rest of 
Croatia by setting up roadblocks and barriers and issuing political declarations that 
the Croats saw as threats and provocations. This was the beginning of what would a 
year later escalate into a war in Croatia, only to then spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina 
in April 1992.
Retrospectively, one may conclude that the events of August 17 and those that 
followed made any attempts for a workable confederation almost impossible. In part, 
the Serb rebellion in Krajina was directed against any coalition between Slovenia and 
Croatia.68 And indeed, after August 17, Slovenia found itself exactly in the position 
that it had most wanted to avoid—by becoming a side in a violent Serb-Croat con-
flict. Logically, this led many Slovenes to ask themselves: would it not be better to 
accept Milošević’s offer to secede and leave the Croats behind?
As a consequence, the Demos line, which promoted full independence more 
openly, was now prevailing in Slovenia. This was also what Serbian nationalists in 
Belgrade wanted. This line did not exclude the possibility of a confederation, but it 
did not want to commit Slovenia to only one option either. The argument was most 
clearly presented by the leading pro-Demos commentator, Janko Lorenci, in his article 
published by Delo only five days after the “events in Knin,” as he called the rebellion 
in Krajina region of which Knin was the administrative centre:
The chances for a gentlemen’s agreement between the republics, for a workable con-
federation treaty, now seem to be slim. Even if talks on confederation continue, 
they would still be held under a deep shadow of complete chaos. . . . What does 
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that mean for Slovenia? More than anything else it means that Slovenia must return 
to a multiple options strategy, which has been abandoned of late for a policy of 
one single option—the confederation. This happened for a great many reasons: 
because of economic weakness, dependence on the Yugoslav market, because of 
a lack of support from abroad, because of many—not least military—threats and 
risks that would accompany our road to full independence. However, now—i.e. 
after the events in Knin—it is clear more than ever that confederation could be, 
if not entirely impossible, then certainly a much too distant aim. It certainly is 
so uncertain, that it should not be the only aim we have. To us, Knin should be 
a shock which would re-introduce the aim of Slovenian full independence to our 
political life again—not only as an equally desirable, but perhaps as the most desir-
able alternative to the confederalist tendencies. The politics of “one only option” 
(confederative) takes us to at least as equally uncertain a future as the politics of 
full independence . . .69
The Road to Independence
By October 2, 1990, when the two republics officially proposed the confederation, 
Slovenia was only partly interested in the success of this project. Events that followed 
in the next month—largely in response to the confederalist proposal—saw Slovenia 
more disengaged with each day that passed. On the same day that the confederalist 
proposal was agreed upon, the Krajina Serbs declared autonomy from Croatia. The 
first direct conflict between Croatian police forces and local militias of the “Serb 
Autonomous Region of Krajina” also happened that same day in the town of Dvor. 
At the same time, Borisav Jović (then the president of the Yugoslav state presidency) 
received a delegation of the Krajina Serbs in Belgrade in what was a clear demon-
stration of support. The next day, the Yugoslav presidency concluded that Yugosla-
via was “on the verge of a civil war.”70 Subsequently, the presidency authorized the 
JNA to intervene, with only the Slovenian representative, Janez Drnovšek, voting 
against.71 The Serbian opposition leader, Vuk Drašković, called for a general mobi-
lization in Serbia and announced that his armed “volunteers” would be willing to 
defend Krajina Serbs. Only three days before (September 29, 1990), in an interview 
with Delo, Drašković said:
What the Kingdom of Serbia held when Yugoslavia was created, on 2 December 
1918, must be returned. In addition, in the case of the confederalization of Yugo-
slavia, Serbia must obtain all territories in what is today Herzegovina, Bosnia, Sla-
vonia, Dalmatia, in these parts of Croatia where the Serbs made a majority of the 
population until 6 April 1941, when the Ustasha genocide against them began. . . . 
Wherever the Serb blood was shed by the Ustashas’ knives, wherever there are our 
graves—there are our borders. Tudjman, or whoever else would want to trespass, 
cannot do that at a negotiating table—but only at the battlefield!72
While issuing an open threat to Croats, Drašković issued a very reconciliatory state-
ment about the Slovenes: “Slovenes have never tried to exterminate the Serbs, so 
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why would we want now to be an obstacle in [the] Slovenian road to independence, 
towards full statehood?”
Drašković’s radical speeches and open invitations at arms, showed to the Slovenes 
that confederation would be even less likely if Drašković won the forthcoming Ser-
bian elections. At the same time, however, Drašković seemed to be even more explicit 
than Milošević in his support for a separate Serb-Slovene deal on Slovenia’s secession 
from Yugoslavia.73
In addition, the panicked reaction of the Yugoslav presidency and the JNA to 
the Slovenian-Croatian confederal proposal further helped to shift Slovenian public 
opinion toward supporting independence. Once the presidency had concluded that 
Yugoslavia was on the verge of a civil war, the federal military police occupied the 
headquarters of the Slovenian Territorial Defence units on October 5, 1990. Slovenes 
saw this as showing straightforward contempt for the decisions of their democrati-
cally elected parliament. A public opinion survey conducted the next day revealed 
that 88.4 percent of Slovenes believed that the Slovenian political leadership (not 
the federal presidency) was the legitimate commander of the Slovenian Territorial 
Defense units. More importantly, when asked, “If confederation proves to be impos-
sible, would you be in favor of Slovenia remaining a part of a Yugoslav federation, or 
in favor of secession from Yugoslavia?” 79.9 percent of the Slovenes said they wanted 
secession and only 5.3 percent federation (with 14.8 percent undecided).74
This was a signal to Slovene secessionists that a failure of a confederal proposal 
would play in their favor. In another public opinion survey, published in Delo on 
October 20, 1990, 43.2 percent of Slovenian respondents said they would be pre-
pared to defend Slovenian sovereignty “by taking up weapons, if it was endangered,” 
and a further 36 percent gave a conditionally positive answer to this question (“yes, 
but only if absolutely necessary”).
Thus, by the beginning of November 1990, it had become clear that “in their 
minds, the Slovenes have already left Yugoslavia behind” as Tudjman’s foreign pol-
icy advisor, Darko Bekić, said in his interview to Journal de Geneve.75 Bekić argued 
that “only the Croats are serious about it, only they want to save Yugoslavia in this 
moment.” And indeed, very soon afterward, on November 9, the Demos coalition 
officially proposed a plebiscite on Slovenian sovereignty. The initiative for the plebi-
scite was launched after the meeting between the Demos and the Serbian opposi-
tion parties—thus, further deepening the gap between the Slovenian and Croatian 
politicians. Jože Pučnik explained the motives:
For more than two months already, confederation seems to be an impossible solu-
tion for the problems of Yugoslavia. Perhaps we could agree on it with Croatia 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina—although, after the events in Knin this became rather 
impossible too. It is therefore now the case that we will have to act on our own. 
Our confederal proposal was given as a matter of principle—but it seems that there 
is no realistic chance for its implementation. Therefore, our support for confed-
eration is more of a tactical nature. The point we are making is that we would be 
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ready to accept a confederation too, in order to negotiate about the best solution 
to this problem. But, the others are not ready to accept this offer.76
Although he did not explicitly admit it, there was another internal reason for Demos 
to speed up with independence—and that was the growing unpopularity of Demos 
among the Slovenian electorate. In a public opinion survey conducted by Delo at the 
beginning of November, Demos was now significantly behind the reformed com-
munists in electoral support—with 36.9 percent to 42.5 percent.77 Its leader, Jože 
Pučnik, was one of the least popular politicians in Slovenia—ranked only sixteenth 
out of twenty leading Slovenian politicians. For Demos and Pučnik, thus, the plebi-
scite was a vote-catching initiative too—an attempt to promote Demos as the “most 
Slovene” of all Slovenian political groups.
Apart from this internal factor, two external factors also helped—although 
unintentionally—the Slovenian secessionists’ cause. The first one was the unification 
of Germany, on October 3, 1990 (the day after the confederal proposal was agreed 
upon). Germany’s unification challenged the Helsinki principle on the status quo of 
the borders in Europe. In addition, the unification was a result of the implementa-
tion of the principle of self-determination, thus of the same principle the Slovenian 
(and Croatian) secessionists claimed for themselves. This all created “a very difficult 
situation for us non-separatists in Slovenia,” as admitted by Milan Kučan.78
The second unlikely source of support was the European Community. In 1990, 
the EC was fully supportive of the policy of “unity and democracy”79 and in this vein 
supported the government of Ante Marković. It also warned Slovenia that it would 
not be recognized if it seceded unilaterally.80 In order to demonstrate its full support 
for the federal government, on November 1, 1990, the EC decided to include Yugo-
slavia in the PHARE program.81 Furthermore, the German minister of foreign affairs, 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, expressed Germany’s full support for Yugoslavia’s prospec-
tive membership in the European Community after his meeting with Yugoslavia’s 
Foreign Secretary, Budimir Lončar on September 2, 1990.82
The prospect of Yugoslavia (united and democratic) joining the EC made Slo-
venian and Croatian secessionists nervous. As Darko Bekić said in an interview with 
the foreign press on November 6, 1990, “Croatia did not want to enter Europe as an 
anonymous province of Greater Serbia.”83 In his strategic paper presented to Slove-
nian state presidency, Dimitrij Rupel was even more explicit, saying that “Slovenia 
must approach the restructuring of Europe as a nation-state, not as a subordinated 
unit of Yugoslavia.” The EC offer to include Yugoslavia in some of its programs 
thus had an unintentional consequence: it encouraged the secessionists to speed up. 
What also encouraged them was a prospect of losing the “democracy argument.” 
Before the Serbian elections in December 1990, Slovenia and Croatia argued that 
in its essence the conflict they had with Serbia was a conflict between “democratic 
western republics” and “unreformed Serbia, led by [the] neo-Stalinist Milošević.” 
With the elections in Serbia approaching, this argument was no longer valid. With 
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the elections in all Yugoslav republics nearly completed, secessionists expected more 
direct pressure for federal elections, which they wanted to avoid because such elec-
tions would democratically legitimize Yugoslav state institutions. In order to prevent 
federal elections, the Slovenian parliament concluded on November 13, 1990, that 
the Yugoslav state “no longer functioned” and that Slovenia therefore “had no future 
in Yugoslavia” because “economic and national death awaits us in it.”84 A declaration 
by the Demos representatives in Slovenian parliament stated: “International politics 
is not inclined or supportive of us, but—no state can be recognized before it becomes 
a state. Therefore, we first must establish the state, i.e., we must become independent 
from Yugoslavia. Taking into account that the great powers and European states are 
not supportive of us, we can expect great resistance and crisis to follow the plebiscite. 
People should be aware of this when they vote.”85
Not everybody in Slovenia—and even less in Croatia—was supportive of this 
decision. The Slovenian reformed communists argued that the timing was inappro-
priate and that there was no certainty that independence was favored by a major-
ity.86 However, the opinion polls conducted at the time showed that independence 
was taking roots among the Slovenian electorate. On November 17, 1990, 64 per-
cent of the Slovenes said they would vote for independence, whereas 16.1 percent 
would be against (and 19.6 percent undecided). People were less optimistic 
when asked whether Slovenia would be able to survive as an independent state: 
49.7 percent said it would, and 15.6 percent said it would not.87 But, one can safely 
 assume that the Slovenes were even more pessimistic about Slovenia’s prospects in 
Yugoslavia, which now increasingly appeared to be sinking into chaos, anarchy, 
and bloodshed. In this context, uncertainties and fears were still the prevailing 
 sentiments among the Slovenes. During the brief war with the JNA in June and 
July 1991, these sentiments would be successfully manipulated by political elites 
and the media with the objective of achieving the unity of the nation faced with 
a realistic and serious threat.
Once the Demos agreed that the plebiscite question should also include a pos-
sibility that a sovereign state of Slovenia might enter into confederalist agreement 
with other Yugoslav states, a compromise was reached. Under the chairmanship of 
Milan Kučan, Slovenian political parties agreed on November 14, 1990, to call up 
a plebiscite for December 23, 1990.88
Croatian politicians were not amused by this decision, especially because it 
looked to them as if the immediate incentive for the rush came from the meeting 
between the Demos and Serbian opposition parties, which was held in Belgrade on 
October 24, 1990. President Tudjman made his contempt explicit in his statement 
to Delo: “When it comes to solutions to current problems in Yugoslavia, you in Slo-
venia are a bit impatient, while we in Croatia have some other problems to solve too. 
A large number of Croats live beyond the borders of Croatia, and as we all know—the 
Knin has happened too. . . . Croatia therefore thinks it should not get itself into a 
position in which it takes steps which cannot bring it any concrete results.”89
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Behind closed doors, Croatian politicians were even more direct in their criti-
cism of Slovenian “selfishness.” They feared that Slovenia might build up border-
posts on its border with Croatia, which might deter some Croats from supporting 
Croatian independence.90 In addition, the Slovenian example encouraged radical 
secessionists in Croatia (including those within the HDZ) to pressure the moderate 
confederalists, and—to some extent—Tudjman himself. In November 1990, one 
of the leading Croatian separatists, Vladimir Veselica, received a standing ovation 
from the HDZ representatives in the Sabor when he said that “a nation without a 
state is like a turtle without a shell.”91 At the same time, Croatian public opinion also 
moved toward supporting full independence, at least as a feasible option. In a public 
opinion survey that I conducted for Danas in the last days of November 1990, 
54 percent of the Croatian electorate said that Croatia, too, should organize a plebi-
scite if Slovenes decided at their plebiscite to leave Yugoslavia. Against were 31 percent, 
and 15 percent of respondents were undecided. However, the split between ethnic 
Croats and ethnic Serbs—as well as between supporters of the HDZ and those who 
voted for opposition parties—now became almost complete. Among ethnic Croats, 
support for a plebiscite on independence was as high as 64 percent, whereas among 
the ethnic Serbs it was as low as 8 percent. In a sign of clear support for a more radi-
cal line within the party, the HDZ-voters were overwhelmingly (85 percent) sup-
portive of the idea.92
Tudjman’s chief domestic policy advisor, Slaven Letica, admitted in December 
that “Kučan’s and Tudjman’s vision of Yugoslavia is now also somewhat outdated.”93 
The road to independence was now opened wide. In public discourse of the time, 
confederation was not yet entirely abandoned. However, neither of its two original 
promoters now perceived it as a desirable or even a feasible solution to the Yugoslav 
problem. At best, they thought of it as a tactic by means of which they could buy 
time. This time would be used to secure an alibi against accusations that they had 
destroyed Yugoslavia and to prepare new institutions, as well domestic and interna-
tional public opinion, for a full declaration of independence. In the Croatian case 
in particular, the time would be used to prepare for a war that now looked almost 
inevitable in the aftermath of Slovenia’s decision to leave Yugoslavia.
Conclusions
The Slovenian plebiscite on December 23, 1990, confirmed overwhelming 
(88.2 percent of those who voted, with 93.2 percent turnout) support for Slovenian de 
facto independence, although the actual question included an option that, once 
independent, Slovenia could enter into an association of Yugoslav states, should they 
wish to form a confederation.94 By lex specialis enacted prior to the plebiscite, the 
implementation of the plebiscite’s decision should take no longer than six months. 
In these six months, Slovenia negotiated with others nothing else but the models of 
becoming independent. To this effect, its leadership engaged in a series of bilateral 
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meetings with other republics. On January 24, 1991, bilateral talks with Serbian 
leadership were held in Belgrade—ending in mutual recognition of the right to self-
determination. In the next two weeks, meetings with Bosnian, Montenegrin, and 
Macedonian leaders followed. Between March 27 and April 29, five multilateral meet-
ings of six presidents of Yugoslav republics took place with no positive results. On 
the negative side, they worsened the general political situation in Yugoslavia because 
they demonstrated a complete disunity and the scale of the tensions between politi-
cal leaders. This tended to galvanize the population at large in support of their lead-
ers and against the others. They also offered another good alibi to Slovenia—which 
claimed that no solution was possible within the existing framework. By May 1991, 
the Yugoslav federal presidency was blocked, first by a permanent stalemate in voting 
(with four votes against four) and then by a temporary resignation of its president, 
Borisav Jović, on March 15, 1991. An attempt by the JNA Headquarters to intro-
duce a state of emergency failed in March 1991. On May 15, 1991, the Serbian and 
Montenegrin members of the presidency blocked (until July 1, 1991) election of 
Stjepan Mesić, the Croatian representative, as its next president.
On May 19, 1991, Croatia, which feared that it would be left in a “rump 
 Yugoslavia” once Slovenia formally seceded, held a referendum on its own future. 
As Vladimir Đuro Degan concludes, the Croatian referendum was formally a choice 
between a confederation and a federation—but everyone knew it was a “plebiscite on 
independence.”95 Turnout at the referendum was 83.6 percent. The results showed 
that 93.2 percent were supportive of the proposal “that the Republic of Croatia, as a 
sovereign and independent state, which guarantees cultural autonomy and all civic 
rights to Serbs and members of other nationalities in Croatia, can enter into a union 
of sovereign states with other republics (as proposed by the Republic of Croatia and 
the Republic of Slovenia).” The other proposal—“that the Republic of Croatia remains 
in Yugoslavia as a united federal state, as proposed by the Republic of Serbia and the 
Socialist Republic of Montenegro”—was supported by 5.4 percent of the electorate. 
The Serbs from Krajina boycotted this referendum because they had already (on April 
1, 1991) declared the Republic of Serb Krajina independent from Croatia.
Despite warnings that no republic would be recognized if it seceded unilater-
ally,96 Slovenia and Croatia declared full state independence on the same day, June 
25, 1991.97 The next day, a conflict between the units of JNA stationed in Slovenia 
and the newly created Slovenian army and police began. Once it ended on July 7, 
Slovenia and Croatia agreed to suspend implementation of their declarations of inde-
pendence for three months in order to enable negotiations on a peaceful resolution of 
the Yugoslav crisis. To this end, the EC organized a conference on Yugoslavia chaired 
by Lord Carrington. The conference proposed a confederal solution to Yugoslavia’s 
problems. Slovenia and Croatia formally agreed, not out of any enthusiasm for the 
confederal proposal, but primarily for two other reasons: they needed international 
support and protection (and thus had to be seen as cooperative with international 
 efforts to resolve the Yugoslav problem), and they correctly assumed that Serbia would 
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never accept a confederation along the lines proposed by Carrington. The Carrington 
proposal had many elements of the original Slovenian and Croatian confederation a 
la carte, and it also meant international recognition of independence for all Yugoslav 
republics who applied for independence. For Serbia this was unacceptable because 
it meant—as Slobodan Milošević stated on November 5, 1990—“the abolition of 
Yugoslavia by the stroke of a pen.”
In the meantime, the Yugoslav state presidency agreed (on July 18) to withdraw 
all JNA troops from Slovenia in a decision supported by Serbian representatives, to 
the complete surprise of the Yugoslav Army, of international factors, and even of 
Slovenian and Croatian leadership. The only member of the Yugoslav presidency 
who voted against this decision was Stjepan Mesić, the Croatian representative. This 
 decision—more than any other—contributed to a change of policy of some key 
 European states (especially Germany) toward the issue of Yugoslavia’s unity. After all, 
once the Yugoslav state presidency decided to withdraw its own army from Slovenia 
(not only to barracks, as agreed on by the Brioni Declaration of July 7, 1991), how 
could one expect other states to insist for much longer on their policy of a democratic 
and united Yugoslavia? If Serbia agreed to support Slovenian de facto independence, 
how could one expect Germany or Austria to oppose it? With Slovenia becoming de 
facto independent following the withdrawal of the JNA troops in October 1991,98 
the de jure independence was now only a step away. But so was also a combined 
assault of the Krajina forces, JNA and Serbian “volunteers” first on the units of the 
Croatia’s National Guard and then in an all-out assault on the civilian population 
in general. When the war in Croatia intensified in August 1991, for a large major-
ity of the Croats—but also for a growing number of Macedonians and Bosnians—
 independence became the only possible option. The confederation proposal now lay 
under the ruins of Dubrovnik and Vukovar, which were both attacked in fall 1991. 
International recognition of Slovenia and Croatia followed on January 15, 1992.
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